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ABSTRACT 
The debate about whether sub-state actors have an interest in conducting a WMD 
attack using chemical or biological weapons is embedded within escalation theory, which 
holds that in order to maintain credibility terrorist groups must demonstrate a continued 
ability to conduct operations and inflict significant numbers of casualties on their enemy, 
maintaining a consistent, if not escalating, level of violence.  This thesis uses E. coli in 
produce and foot and mouth disease in livestock case studies to evaluate U.S. Systems’ 
ability to contain such an agroterror attack and to estimate likely results of such attacks.  
The analysis shows that neither a FMD attack on livestock nor an E. coli attack on 
produce is likely to cause sufficient casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear and panic 
to constitute escalation from recent conventional attacks for an established international 
terrorist organization, and therefore agroterror attacks are not likely to be particularly 
attractive for such organizations. 
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I. ESCALATION AND AGROTERRORISM 
The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the 
means to the end of causing economic damage, social unrest, and loss of 
confidence in government.1 
 
Early detection of bioterrorist events is essential because although most 
diseases caused by bioterrorist threat agents are rapidly fatal, any are 
readily treatable and/or preventable with timely administration of 




Nearly six years after the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism 
remains a great threat to the United States.  There has been much speculation about the 
nature of the next attack, and whether it will be another innovative conventional attack 
using explosives of some type or whether it might be something unconventional, using a 
weapon of mass destruction (WMD).3  If the next attack is of a chemical or biological 
nature, both the range in character of the attacks and potential impact are quite 
significant.  With the arrest of Jose Padilla in 2002, it became apparent that anti-
American terrorist groups like Al Qaeda had no compunction against pursing a “dirty 
bomb” that would spread radioactive material within the United States.  Other attacks 
might be against physical infrastructure such as power grids, or cyber-terrorism against 
critical computer networks.  The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and centralization of many antiterrorism responsibilities has shown the U.S. is 
making progress in many aspects of the prevention and response to terrorism; however, 
with respect to America’s vulnerability to an unconventional attack, debate continues 
over what form an unconventional terrorist attack would most likely take (nuclear,  
 
                                                 
1 Jim Monke, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, August 25, 2006, ii, 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32521.pdf (accessed October 16, 2007). 
2 State of California, “Bioterrorism Surveillance and Epidemiologic Response Plan,” January 2002, 5. 
3 See the collection of essays in Russell Howard, James Forest, Joanne Moore, Homeland Security and 
Terrorism; Readings and Interpretations, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006). 
2 
chemical or biological), and what the most likely targets would be (people or agriculture).  
This thesis will evaluate the existing systems for prevention and response as well as the 
likely impact of an attack on agriculture.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
U.S. agriculture is a robust part of the global economy, generating more than $1 
trillion a year, with more than $50 billion resulting from agricultural exports in 2005, 
estimated to increase to $77 billion in 2007 and nearly $95 billion in 2016.4  Net U.S. 
farm income in 2006 was assessed at $60.6 billion and is expected to increase to an 
average of $66.7 billion annually over the next 10 years.5  The U.S. remains the leading 
exporter of numerous agricultural products such as, wheat, corn, soybeans and cotton.6  
U.S. meat exports are expected to increase approximately 20% in the next 8 years,7 
reaching nearly 27 billion pounds in 2007 and exceeding 28 billion pounds by 2016.8  
These figures represent approximately 13.9 percent of the U.S. GNP.9   
Modern terrorists have shown a not only an acceptance of unconventional 
methods, but also a desire to undertake new and dramatic attacks on the West, and 
American agriculture presents a robust, diversified, and accessible target.  “Because of its 
breadth, diversity, and unparalleled success, US agriculture is an inviting target for 
terrorists.”10  A terrorist attack on U.S. agriculture could have far reaching impact; a 
successful infection of a type of crop or livestock could have dramatic impact on its 
                                                 
4 United States Department of Agriculture, “USDA Long-Term Agricultural Projection Tables,” 
USDA Economics, Statistics, and Market Information System, February, 2007, 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewStaticPage.do?url=http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/ers
/94005/./2007/ accessed August 15, 2007, United States Government Accountability Office, “Homeland 
Security: Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges 
Remain,” (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2005) (accessed November 22, 2006), 1. 
5 United States Department of Agriculture; “Agricultural Baseline Projections: U.S. Agricultural 
Sector Measures, 2007-2016,” USDA Economic Research Service, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Baseline/agsector.htm (accessed August 15, 2007). 
6 See attached graphs at Appendix A. 
7 See attached graph at Appendix B. 
8 “USDA Long-Term Agricultural Projection Tables.” 
9 Jason B. Moats, Agroterrorism; A Guide for First Responder, (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press), 2007, 5. 
10 Henry S. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism:  A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat,” (Washington 
D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002), vi. 
3 
marketability, and a successful attack would undermine American confidence in the 
effectiveness of the government to protect them against terrorism and specifically 
safeguard their food supply.  Thus, it is crucial that an intelligent assessment of U.S. 
preparedness against the threat of a CBW attack on agriculture be made.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before the 2001 U.S. anthrax letter attacks, experts in the field of chemical and 
biological terrorism wrote assessments arguing that the challenges of obtaining, 
developing, weaponizing, and dispensing effective levels of either chemical or biological 
agents were too great for a non-state actor such as a terrorist group to overcome.  
Analysis presented by authors like Jonathan Spyer, Jonathan Tucker and John Parachini 
pointed to the technological hurdles of creating an effective CBW program.11  In a 2001 
Rand report Parachini stated: “Terrorist groups and individuals historically have not 
employed biological weapons because of a combination of formidable barriers to 
acquisition and use and comparatively readily available alternatives and disincentives.”12  
Even the most successful terrorist chemical attack only killed twelve people and injured 
several hundred.  Compared to the more devastating conventional attacks like those of 
September 11th, historical CBW attacks cause casualties more on the order of magnitude 
of a single suicide bomber.  Parachini noted that while states have long histories of robust 
CBW programs, “handling virulent materials and fashioning them into weapons capable 
of producing mass casualties is beyond the reach of most sub-national groups or 
individuals.”13  Other experts in the field of CBW discussed the specific hurdles sub-state 
                                                 
11 See analysis presented in Jonathan Spyer, “The Al-Qa’ida Network and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” Open Source Center, September 1, 2004, http://opensource.dni.sgov.gov/cgi-bin/cgcgi 
(accessed June 1, 2007), Toxic Terror; Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 
Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, MIT Press; Cambridge, 2000, and John Parachini’s 2001 testimonials before 
Congress such as  “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism,” Statement of 
John Parachini, Policy Analyst, RAND Washington Officer, October 12, 2001, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT183.pdf (accessed June 19, 2007).  
12 John Parachini, “Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses,” RAND 
Publication CT -186, November 6, 2001, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT186.pdf (accessed 
June 19, 2007). 
13 John Parachini, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism,” Statement of 
John Parachini, Policy Analyst, RAND Washington Officer, October 12, 2001, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT183.pdf (accessed June 19, 2007).  
4 
groups face with the development of both chemical and biological weapons.14  
“Acquiring a deliverable CBW capability requires terrorists to overcome a series of major 
hurdles: gaining access to specialized chemical ingredients or virulent microbial strains; 
acquiring equipment and know-how for agent production and dispersal; and creating an 
organizational structure capable of resisting infiltration or early detection by law 
enforcement.”15  Even should a group overcome development challenges, effective 
dissemination of both types of agents was seen to pose additional challenges.  “Crude 
delivery methods are likely to remain the most common forms of CBW terrorism.  They 
are potentially capable of inflicting at most tens to hundreds of fatalities…but not the 
mass death predicted by the most alarmist scenarios.”16  Effective vaporization of 
chemicals is difficult, and challenges of producing a certain spore size or preventing 
dilution of biological agents are especially complicated.  Thus, these scholars concluded 
that while states should be aware of the potential threat of a CBW attack, the greater risk 
continued to be from a conventional attack, even if it relied upon unconventional methods 
like the airplanes used as guided missiles during the September 11th attacks.  However, 
with significant changes in terrorist tactics, goals, and capabilities, most prominent 
experts have now revised their assessments.   
The 2001 anthrax attacks changed the consensus on the sub-state WMD threat.  
While analysts continue to acknowledge that there are still significant challenges for a 
non-state actor in obtaining, developing, weaponizing and dispensing effective levels of 
either chemical or biological weapons, they now recognize that modern terrorist groups 
such as Al Qaeda have the means and patience to pursue active WMD programs, and are 
attracted by certain aspects of using CBW in an attack.  While “[i]t was once generally 
believed to be too difficult for terrorists to produce sophisticated biological weapons and 
too risky for states to use them clandestinely against the United States,” recent efforts by 
terrorist groups (especially al Qaeda) have demonstrated significant progress in 
                                                 
14 See specifically Jonathan B. Tucker, “Introduction,” in Toxic Terror; Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, MIT Press; Cambridge, 2000, 6-7. 
15 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” in Toxic Terror; Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, MIT Press; Cambridge, 2000, 253. 
16 Tucker, “Lessons from the Case Studies,” 253. 
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overcoming many of the hurdles historically identified in earlier analyses.17  John 
Parachini wrote in November 2001: “The sophisticated quality of the Anthrax used in the 
letter sent to Senator Daschle suggests that the bioterrorism threat has reached a new 
level previously viewed by many analysts, myself included, as possible, but unlikely.”18   
There is now a consensus in the literature that CBW agents are within reach of 
terrorist groups.19  However, there continues to be a debate about whether sub-state 
actors have an interest in conducting a WMD attack using chemical or biological 
weapons, and if so, what the most likely targets are.  This debate is embedded within 
escalation theory, which holds that in order to maintain credibility terrorist groups must 
demonstrate a continued ability to conduct operations and inflict significant numbers of 
casualties on their enemy, maintaining a consistent, if not escalating, level of violence.20  
Proponents of escalation theory hold that Al Qaeda would lose legitimacy if it attempted 
another large-scale attack and failed, which would likely have severe repercussions on 
recruiting, fundraising, and global support from other extremist groups.21  However, there 
is a debate within the literature on escalation about the likely impact, and therefore the 
appeal, of WMD attacks by terrorists.  One camp holds that major terrorist groups like Al 
Qaeda are unlikely to undertake a chemical or biological attack even if they have basic 
                                                 
17 John Parachini, “Control Biological Weapons, but Defend Biotechnology,” Rand Review, 
(Summer 2002): 34. 
18 Parachini, “Anthrax Attacks, Biological Terrorism and Preventive Responses.” 
19 The lack of availability of CBW agents no longer seems to be a significant hurdle for terrorist 
groups with significant financial resources.  Although in the post-9/11 environment the U.S. has increased 
restrictions and safeguards for dangerous biological agents, “beyond the United States it is frightening to 
note what little regulation other countries have imposed governing the transfer, storage, and use of 
dangerous pathogens.”  (Parachini, “Control Biological Weapons, but Defend Biotechnology,” 35.)  Many 
nations with highly developed CBW programs are at risk for proliferating their technology or actual agents 
to the highest bidders  For further information on state CBW programs, see Jonathan Tucker article “The 
Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State 
Actors,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 7, 2001, 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/ttuck2.htm (accessed June 4, 2007). 
20 Some analysts refer to an attack threshold at which a group becomes an established, or “legitimate,” 
terrorist organization.  Once they reach this threshold, they must maintain that level of intensity and their 
attacks must not fall below the established level of impact.  See for example Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far 
Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.  Alice Hills 
also discusses escalation theory in her article, “Responding to Catastrophic Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, 25:4, 245 – 261.  Bruce Riedel briefed Naval Postgraduate School students on Al Qaeda’s 
escalation of tactics Bruce Riedel, Untitled Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 24, 
2007). 
21 See discussion in Parachini, “Combating Terrorism” and Spyer’s “The Al-Qa’ida Network.” 
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capabilities to launch one, because such an attack is likely to result in lower numbers of 
casualties than conventional attacks and thus would actually damage their credibility.22  
The other camp argues that the economic and/or psychological impact of CBW would be 
significant enough to compensate for a reduced number of casualties.23 
This debate is largely theoretical and deals with perception by terrorist groups of 
the significance their attacks will have to their target and the subsequent impact on their 
legitimacy and recruitment and fundraising efforts.  There is no systematic evaluation of 
evidence to give more weight to the arguments of either camp.  Therefore, to assess 
which argument is more credible, this thesis will investigate the likelihood of human 
casualties (both sickness and/or deaths) as well as the economic and psychological impact 
of a CBW attack.  This can then be compared to recent terrorist attacks such as those of 
9/11 to determine if such an attack would be attractive to a terrorist group like Al Qaeda, 
in accordance with the theory of escalation. 
                                                 
22 Proponents of this school of thought point to the Aum Shinrikyo attempts to deliver chemical and 
biological weapons in Japan that over a 10 year period killed 20 people and the 2001 U.S. Anthrax attacks 
that killed 5 people.  Additionally, while the initial emotional impact was significant, recovery in both cases 
was quick, and most people resumed their normal routines fairly quickly.  Fran Townsend, assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism stated “Al Qaeda will continue to attempt to 
conduct usually dramatic mass casualty attacks on the United States, will continue to try to acquire and 
employ chemical, biological, and radiological materials, and ‘will not hesitate to use them.” (“Kuna: Al 
Qaeda Still Poses Evolving Threat to U.S. Intelligence Report Concludes,” Jul 17, 2007, 
www.intelink.sgov.gov/news (accessed August 23, 2007)).  Additionally, the Apr 24, 2007 EUCOM Daily 
News report concluded, “They [Al-Qaeda] have got to do something soon that is radical otherwise they 
start losing credibility” (“Al Qaeda Planning Big British Attack,” The Sunday Times, Apr 22, 2007, 
http://gidm.eucom.smil.mil:8201/DailyNews Report/2007/24Apr07 (UNCLASS) (accessed August 23, 
2007)).  Enemark discusses terrorist motivation of “constructing their attacks as a form of theatre,” creating 
a “spectacular event,” (Christian Enemark, “Working Paper No. 379,” Canberra: National Library of 
Australia, October 2003).  Finally, analysts at Stratfor conclude, “an attack against U.S. agriculture would 
lack the spectacle that Al-Qaeda prefers—not to mention that such an attack would be unlikely to cause 
mass chaos…[and] does not fit the conventional criteria for an Al-Qaeda Operation,” (“The Unlikely 
Terrorist Threat Against U.S. Agriculture,” Stratfor, Mar 17, 2006, http://intel.socom.smil.mil/socjic/osec 
(UNCLASS) (accessed August 23, 2007). 
23 See discussion in Parachini’s “Combating Terrorism,” Tucker’s Toxic Terror, and Robert Pratt’s 
“Invasive Species: The Biological Threat to America,” in Howard et al, Homeland Security.  Additionally, 
Barry Zellen wrote, “it only takes one successful, symbolic attack of our infrastructure to paralyze our 
nation, shake our confidence, and spread fear across the land…the economic consequences of a widespread 
attack [on U.S. agriculture] would be enormous; and the panic and fear such an attack might reap could 
lead to wide-scale social disruption” (Barry S. Zellen, “Preventing Armageddon II: Confronting the Specter 
of Agriterror,” Strategic Insights, 3:12, Dec 2004). 
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D. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
U.S. agricultural production and distribution are highly concentrated; therefore, 
they potentially pose inviting targets.  However, the U.S. has procedures in place to 
prevent and respond to agricultural contamination.  Would an attack against the nation’s 
agriculture base be likely to create enough casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear 
and uncertainty to be attractive to terrorists?  Is it likely that an agroterror attack would be 
largely contained by the systems in place?  Additionally, while these response measures 
have been effective in recent limited natural outbreaks of contamination, would multiple 
attacks likely overwhelm the system?   
E.  METHODOLOGY 
In order to assess the likely impact of an agroterror attack, and thus the 
attractiveness of such an attack to terrorists, this thesis will use case studies of naturally 
occurring biological incidents in agriculture to establish a baseline of economic impact, 
government response, and resulting public reaction or psychological impact.  The first 
case study will look at the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in Britain and the 
second case study will focus on the 2006 Salinas spinach E. coli contamination; both 
cases will enable an evaluation of the effectives of government response to non-terrorist 
outbreaks of contamination.  These cases form a valuable baseline in this evaluation, as 
they are documented cases in which national economies were impacted and the 
government’s response mechanisms were put into action. The time it took to identify 
these incidents and isolate the contaminated products, as well as the resulting number of 
human casualties, economic impact of sanctions or withdrawals from commerce, and 
public reaction will be used as a baseline for the hypothetical scenarios for hypothetical 
attacks of Foot and Mouth Disease and E. coli.  These scenarios will be used to evaluate a 
purposeful, planned attack against multiple areas of the U.S. agriculture sector and will 
enable evaluation of the likely government response to a more robust attack and the 
resulting ability to limit the impact of such a coordinated attack.  This exercise should 
allow us to make a more informed judgment about the likely impact and thus the 
likelihood of an unconventional attack against US agriculture. 
8 
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II. 2001 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK IN BRITAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is the first of fifteen diseases listed on the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) “A List” of diseases affecting animals (see 
Appendix C).  “A List” diseases have certain distinguishing characteristics, and FMD 
heads the list because it is “one of the most devastating viral animal diseases affecting 
cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle and swine and has occurred in most countries of the 
word at some point during the last century.”24  Internationally prevalent, this hardy, 
contagious disease is difficult to eradicate.  As of 2002, approximately 60 percent of the 
countries in the world had reported cases of FMD (see Figure 1), prompting FMD-free 
countries to undertake concerted efforts to prevent FMD introduction.25  
 
Figure 1.   Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 200226 
                                                 
24 United States Government Accounting Office, “GAO-02-808; Foot and Mouth Disease; To Protect 
U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues,” (Washington D.C.: GAO), 
July 2002, 12. 
25 GAO-02-808, 15. 
26 From GAO-02-808, 15. 
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The presence of any of the OIE “A List” diseases will lead to an immediate, 
complete embargo of any trade directly or indirectly linked to the infected animals.27  
Diseases on less worrisome “List B” will likely only lead to trade restrictions or 
additional inspections.  As one of the most contagious diseases on the “A List,” any FMD 
outbreak, however minor, could have a significant impact on a nation’s economy.   
This chapter will examine the threat FMD poses to the U.S., by first examining 
epidemiology, including prevention efforts, the detection process, epidemiology systems 
in place, along with response and investigation procedures.  An examination of the 2001 
FMD outbreak in the U.K. will facilitate an evaluation of the likely impact of a natural or 
intentional outbreak of FMD in the U.S.  Although FMD affects all cloven hoofed 
animals, this chapter will deal primarily with a cattle-centric outbreak, as this represents 
the largest sector of the American meat industry.  The cattle industry is also more 
concentrated, and is at greater threat of FMD infection than any other sector.  An 
uncontrolled FMD epidemic would have widespread repercussions.   
B. PREVENTION 
One of the main reasons FMD is considered the most serious disease affecting 
livestock is its high level of contagiousness.28  Very small amounts of the FMD virus can 
spread the disease, and it can be transmitted via “aerosol, direct contact, and ingestion.”29  
In fact, a “few hundred microliters of scrapings from the blistered mucosa of an FMD-
infected animal…can provide more than enough agent to initiate an epidemic.”30  The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture has primary responsibility for protecting U.S. cattle and 
dairy herds from diseases such as FMD, and works closely with various other federal 
agencies that play important roles in preventing the spread of the disease.31  Agencies 
                                                 
27 Moats, 19. 
28 Specific risk factors for contamination and spread of FMD are details beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but are examined in great length in Javier M. Ekboir, “Potential Impact of Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
in California; The Role and Contribution of Animal Health Surveillance and Monitoring Services,” 
Agriculture Issues Center: Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources: University of California, 1999. 
29 Ekboir, 39. 
30 Mark Wheelis, Rocco Casagrande, and Laurence V. Madden, “U.S. Agriculture is Vulnerable to 
Bioterror Attacks.” in Lisa Yount, ed., Fighting Bioterrorism. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004, p. 32. 
31 GAO-02-808, 12. 
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such as the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Customs, 
U.S. Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard all 
assist the USDA in what has become a border inspection and surveillance process.  
However, the effectiveness of these efforts remains debated.32  The focus remains on 
detecting animal disease or preventing an already-infected animal from entering the 
country.  To keep FMD out of the country, these agencies focus on surveillance of legal 
trade livestock, preventing unintentional FMD infection, and detecting intentional 
smuggling of unintentionally contaminated meat or animals.  However, the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) has concluded that the country is vulnerable to an intentional 
attempt to smuggle FMD.  
C.  EPIDEMIOLOGY 
1. Detection  
Although FMD rarely affects humans (largely because infected animals have been 
detected before entering the food distribution system), epidemiology in FMD is similar to 
the processes in place to detect and respond to E. coli in humans, which will be discussed 
in Chapter III.  In both cases, the first line of detection is the medical provider; doctors 
for humans, and veterinarians for livestock.  Ultimately, in accordance with the National 
Animal Health Emergency Response Plan (NAHERP), “detection of an animal disease is 
assumed to take place at the livestock owner or county extension agent level.”33   
If FMD appears in the U.S., either intentionally smuggled in or brought in 
unintentionally via infected animals, the focus of FMD control shifts from prevention to 
detection and response.  However, in this area the U.S. faces hurdles as well.  “Initial 
detection relies solely on the livestock owner/operator or local veterinarian recognizing 
an anomaly as potentially representing a highly contagious disease.”34  This detection 
occurs primarily during either three or four stages in which cows can be inspected for 
health.  The first stage is at the farm and the second is at saleyards.  For milk cows, the 
third and final location is milk processing plants.  For beef cattle, the third stage is 
                                                 
32 For further information on U.S. efforts to secure the borders from FMD, see GAO 02-808. 
33 Moats, 69. 
34 Moats, 142. 
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feedlots and then the fourth and final stage is in the move to slaughterhouses.  In all 
cases, the movement of cattle across the nation is significant.  This process of movement 
is termed agromovement, and is defined as “the continuous cycle of movement required 
in farm-to-fork food production, including all aspects of animal transportation, among 
them the movement of finished products destined for distribution and consumption 
throughout the world.”35   
For cattle on both farms and milk processing plants, the primary source of 
surveillance is the farm staff.  Veterinarians serve as an auxiliary means of surveillance, 
but only if they are contacted by farm staff with regard to animal health concerns.  Much 
like human infectious disease surveillance, veterinarians serve as the primary care 
providers and carry the responsibility of identifying, diagnosing, and treating animal 
infections or disease.  When cattle are brought to saleyards, they are inspected by 
potential buyers, and “in most cases, a state livestock inspector and a brand inspector 
check incoming animals, and determine whether they have to be checked more closely in 
the slaughterhouse.”36  There are usually veterinarians on site, but it would be unusual 
and cost prohibitive for them to mandate inspection of all animals upon arrival.   
Feedlots are large concentrations of cattle brought into consolidated locations for 
fattening in the final few months prior to slaughter.  “More than 70 percent of the 
nation’s cattle production is kept within a 500-mile radius on just 2 percent of the 
nation’s feedlots.  On these large ‘superlots’ there may be more than 250,000 head of 
cattle.37  Another study estimates “the largest 30 feedlots will generate 50 percent of the 
finished cattle” within the U.S.38  Similar to farms and milk processing facilities, the 
primary source of identification of sick animals would be accomplished by the staff or 
periodic veterinarian checks.  However, the closest inspection of cattle in these areas is 
accomplished when the animals are transported from auction to the feedlot and then again 
when they are transported to the slaughter house.  If an infected animal were identified in 
                                                 
35 Terry Knowles et al, “Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from 
Agroterrorism,” U.S. Department of Justice, December 2005, 110. 
36 Ekboir, 22. 
37 Moats, 8. 
38 Rocco Casagrande, “Biological Terrorism Targeted at Agriculture:  The Threat to U.S. National 
Security,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, 96. 
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this latter transport stage, significant numbers of other animals would probably be 
infected as well.  Slaughterhouse inspections are more stringently regulated, but 
thoroughness of inspections can vary.  “Slaughterhouses are controlled by either federal 
or state inspectors to insure that they comply with technical and sanitary standards.”39 
Some contend even trained veterinarians may not immediately recognize a non-
endemic disease when they see it for the first time.  In many cases, “veterinary schools 
have often failed to teach students how to spot early signs of foreign animal diseases.”40  
In fact, “only about 26 percent of the nation’s veterinary graduates have taken a course 
specifically dedicated to foreign animal diseases.”41  Training in foreign disease 
identification is not required to obtain USDA accreditation – an accreditation that 80 
percent of the nation’s veterinarians obtain as part of the APHIS National Veterinary 
Accreditation Program.  While efforts by the USDA to ensure veterinarians have at least 
basic training in foreign diseases is ongoing, and the “USDA is working to update the 
Veterinary Accreditation system to emphasize continuing education,”42 to include foreign 
diseases, this gap in veterinarian training presents a vulnerability in one of the first lines 
of disease detection.  To add to the challenge, FMD can sometimes present vague or 
misleading symptoms, hampering quick identification of the disease.  “The clinical signs 
of FMD are easily confused with other diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, vesicular 
exanthema and swine vesicular disease.”43  These diseases are naturally occurring within 
the U.S., so a FMD case might be initially misdiagnosed, slowing the response, required 
quarantine, and subsequent traceback efforts. 
2. Epidemiological Systems 
As with diseases that affect humans, federal agencies have developed databases 
and reporting systems to facilitate rapid transference of information regarding animal 
                                                 
39 Ekboir, 23. 
40 Michael A. Gips, “Protection of U.S. Agriculture Against Bioterror Attacks Has Been 
Strengthened,” in Lisa Yount, ed., Fighting Bioterrorism, San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004, 45. 
41 United States Government Accounting Office, “GAO-05-214; Homeland Security: Much is Being 
Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain,” Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, March 2005, 28. 
42 GAO-05-214, 81 
43 Ekboir, 40. 
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diseases.  The most robust of these is the National Animal Health Surveillance System 
(NAHSS), which “is a network of partners working together through surveillance to 
protected animal health. The goal of the NAHSS is to systematically collect, collate, and 
analyze animal health data and promptly disseminate animal health information, 
especially to those partners obligated to respond.”44  However, critics of the system point 
out its flaws, the time it takes to populate and report disease and health data.  Even with 
NAHSS, “there is no integrated national system that can report diseases and infestations 
electronically in real time.”45 
A tool that can be used to assist in animal tracking and disease traceback efforts is 
the National Animal Identification System (NAIS), which is a voluntary State-Federal-
Industry partnership designed to facilitate animal identification and tracking.46  The 
concept behind NAIS is that when an infected animal is identified, this tracking would 
facilitate rapid tracking of the animal’s origins, movements, and areas in which it would 
have come into contact with other animals, potentially passing its infection to other 
animals.  However, large segments of the national beef industry (as well as others) resist 
tracking mechanisms because “of the costs involved and the potential for the 
unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information.”47  Although some members of the 
industry have prioritized the benefits of this system over the potential costs, large 
segments of the industry continue to resist, and have not enrolled in this voluntary 
system. 
3. Response and Investigation 
Response to an outbreak of FMD in the U.S. would be a critical partnership of 
cattle owners, veterinarians, and federal and state authorities.  “A timely response [to a 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Animal Monitoring and Health Surveillance; National Animal 
Health Surveillance System,” http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahss/nahss.htm, accessed October 23, 2007. 
45 Institute of Medicine National Research Council of the National Academies, Countering 
Bioterrorism; The Role of Science and Technology, Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, 
2002, 24. 
46 U.S. Department of Agriculture, “NAIS: At a Glance,” 
http://animalid.aphis.usda.gov/nais/naislibrary/documents/factsheets_brochures/NAIS_AtAGlance-
color.pdf (accessed October 24, 2007). 
47 GAO-02-808, 19. 
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FMD incident] depends on livestock producers’ and private veterinarians’ [sic] quickly 
identifying and reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials.”48  As 
explained above, the local owners and their supporting veterinarians are the primary 
source for disease identification, and the entire response mechanism depends on their 
identification of sick animals to begin the disease identification and response process.   
Once a veterinarian, owner/operator, or health official observes an anomaly, they 
contact the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC), who is the lead federal veterinarian for 
the APHIS Veterinarian Services section for a designated area (usually the state).  The 
AVIC then appoints a Foreign Area Disease Diagnostician (FADD), a certified 
veterinarian trained and certified in Foreign Area Diseases (FAD) by APHIS at Plum 
Island.  The FADD will either eliminate the potential for a FAD, or forward samples to 
the Plum Island facility for testing and definitive identification.  (Diagnostic tests for 
FMD require laboratory tests that are conducted exclusively in the Foreign Animal 
Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum Island, NY.)49  If a positive sample is obtained, 
state regulatory agencies move into response mode, and the suspect facility is placed  
under quarantine.  Immediate investigation is initiated to determine the source of the 
FAD as well as possible cross contamination or secondary infection.50  Further detailed 
actions are shown in Figure 2.   
                                                 
48 GAO-02-808, 56. 
49 Ekboir, 40. 
50 The issue of cross contamination with highly contagious diseases such as FMD is significant.  
Moats gives numerous hypothetic scenarios of veterinarians, feed suppliers, buyers, etc. visiting numerous 
farms, potentially spreading the disease.  Tracebacks of these movements can sometime be nearly 
impossible, which could lead to intense cross-contamination and spread the quarantine and eventual 
decontamination and herd elimination extensively. 
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Figure 2.   Initial Animal Emergency Response Process51 
 
Ultimately, the goal of the response to a FMD infection is immediate response 
and isolation of the affected herd(s).  Once isolated, quarantine, control and recovery 
operations can commence, but without containment the disease can continue to spread.  
As will be discussed below, the initial response and containment in the U.K. to the FMD 
outbreak in 2001 was too slow to prevent widespread infection, leading to a national 
FMD outbreak.  The U.S. faces many challenges in this area as well.  As discussed 
above, there are several stages during which an infected cow can be identified; however, 
traceback investigation will be extremely difficult due to the significant agromovement of 
cattle, as well as the close interaction of staff and veterinarian personnel.  By the time an 
infected cow is identified, it may have moved numerous times and been in contact with 
countless others.  To compound this already difficult problem, trucks used to transport 
infected cows, feed, or by-products may have come into contact with other farms, auction 
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yards, or feedlots.  FMD is so contagious that even coincidental contact could cause 
infection and a contaminated vehicle could contribute to the spread of the disease. 
If the preventive efforts of the nation fail and an epidemic breaks out, the national 
response plan calls for nothing less than disease eradication.  This “stamping-out” 
response entails the “slaughter and burning or burial of all infected and exposed (even 
though asymptomatic) susceptible animals in the quarantine area, followed by clearing 
and disinfection of exposed premises.”52  There are numerous issues associated with the 
large scale culling that would be required, ranging from pure mechanics that include the 
logistics of killing the vast numbers required, disposal mechanisms (burial versus 
burning) to the psychological impact, and how farmers, their families, and the general 
public would respond to large mass graves or huge disposal pyres that fill the air with 
acrid smoke.  Additionally, the resources for identification of FAD are limited and could 
easily be overwhelmed by samples during even a single outbreak. 
The 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak illustrates many of the concerns described above.  
Britain has a similar mechanism of detection and response, relying upon the owners and 
local veterinarians to detect the first signs of contagious disease.  By examining the 
outbreak that occurred, and the associated response mechanisms, this case study will help 
model a potential outbreak of FMD in the U.S., enabling an assessment of the likely 
impact of such an incident. 
D. CASE STUDY 
1. Reporting 
The first case of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001 was reported from infected 
sows in Essex County on February 19th.53  As with most FMD outbreaks, “the first case 
[was] detected and reported by a veterinary surgeon.” 54  Once the first case was reported, 
                                                 
52 Ekboir, 39. 
53 Paul R. Hunter et al, “Foot and Mouth Disease and Cryptosporidiosis: Possible Interaction between 
Two Emerging Infectious Diseases,” Center for Disease Control; Emerging Infectious Diseases, January 
2003, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol9no1/02-0265.htm (accessed October 31, 2007). 
54 Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), “Origin of the U.K. Foot and 
Mouth Disease Epidemic in 2001,” http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/pdf/fmdorigins1.pdf (accessed 
October 30, 2007), 11. 
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response and investigation began, and the speed with which the British government 
responded to this first case is noteworthy.  According to John H. Kirk, Extension 
Veterinarian at the University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine, 
“Within 5 hours of observing classic signs of FMD, a livestock movement ban was 
placed in a 10-mile zone around the area.”55 
While the first case was identified in Essex County, investigation would indicate 
that the original FMD case in Britain was actually a “pig finishing unit” at Burnside 
Farm, Northumberland.  From this first (or index) case, FMD appears to have spread via 
two main avenues.  First, the sows that were transported to Essex County (where they 
became the first reported cases of FMD) and infected other pigs at the facility there.  
Second, and more dramatic, there was an airborne transmission of FMD from pigs on 
Burnside Farm to sheep and cattle on farms in close proximity.  The infected sheep were 
then sold through local markets and dealers and spread FMD quickly throughout 
England, Wales and southern Scotland.56   
2. Response 
After the first case of FMD was identified, the government employed movement 
restrictions.  However, as explained above, the first cases identified were not actually the 
first cases of the disease in the country.  By the time these movement restrictions were 
emplaced, the disease was already outside the initial containment areas.  “The scale of the 
FMD outbreak was greater, and moved much faster, than anticipated.  It escaped from 
‘zones of control’ and appeared in different regions of the country months after the initial 
disease outbreak.”57  Compounding this was the delay “between the introduction of 
infection and the reporting of suspect disease to the authorities.  This contributed to the 
widespread dissemination of disease and the scale of the epidemic.”58 
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To prevent the continued spread of FMD throughout the U.K., the Department of 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs implemented a robust disease control strategy (see 
Figure 3).  This strategy was built upon a series of movement control procedures.  First, 
Protection Zones were established in a three kilometers radius from infected farms.   
     
Figure 3.   The main elements of the U.K. disease control strategy59 
 
Additionally, a Surveillance Zone of 10 kilometers radius was extended beyond that.  
Finally, a national movement ban “affecting cattle, sheep, pigs and other ruminants” was 
imposed throughout England, Scotland, and Wales.  No movement of susceptible animals 
was allowed without special permission and restrictions.60  Additionally, controls were 
implemented on the movement of “animal carcasses and animal gatherings.”61  
Biosecurity measures were also implemented; “in the Protection and Surveillance Zones, 
there [were] requirements for increased levels of biosecurity on farms, movement 
controls, controls on transportation of dung/manure and treatment of animal products to 
ensure destruction of the Foot and Mouth Disease virus.”62 
                                                 
59 From National Audit Office, “The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease,” 21 June 2002, 
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/0102939.pdf (accessed October 31, 2007), 55. 
60 DEFRA, “Foot and Mouth Disease Confirmed in Surrey: National Movement Ban in Place,” 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/latest/2007/animal-0912.htm (accessed October 31, 2007). 
61 DEFRA, “FMD Confirmed in Surrey.” 
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It is critical when evaluating this epidemic to note that although the sows in Essex 
County were the first animals to be diagnosed with FMD in the U.K. in 2001, by the time 
they were identified as sick, the pigs at Burnside Farms had already infected nearby 
sheep and cattle, which were entering the commerce chain and spreading the disease 
throughout the U.K.  Later investigation would conclude that the pigs at Burnside Farms 
were likely infected as early as late January or early February 2001, and that a single case 
of FMD initiated the national epidemic.  In fact, at least 57 farms were infected by the 
time the first outbreak was confirmed on February 20th, and at least 119 farms had been 
infected by the time national movement controls were implemented on February 23.63  
As shown in Figure 4, by the end of April 2001 the majority of cases had been reported;  
however, containment of the disease was incomplete and the epidemic lasted until the end 
of September.  In all, a total of 2,030 cases of FMD in Britain were confirmed during this 
epidemic.64 
 
Figure 4.   Epidemic curve of the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak.65 
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As a result of the national FMD epidemic, the U.K. imposed a national ban on the 
export (and most other nations imposed national bans on the import) of all potentially 
affected meat (port, mutton, beef) as well as associated products that could be infected or 
carry the disease (milk, wool, leather, and other secondary animal products).  As will be 
shown below, these restrictions had a dramatic impact on the U.K. economy. 
Once national movement controls were established, the government began the 
process of containment and eradication.  Authorities pursued containment through 
implementation of the control zones discussed above.  The eradication efforts entailed 
mass slaughter of animals, both infected and exposed, and either mass burial or 
incineration.  Disposal methods are depicted in Figure 5.  “Over 4 million animals were 
slaughtered during the U.K. outbreak to control the disease,”66 and both direct and 
indirect costs were significant. 
 
Figure 5.   Main disposal methods used during the outbreak.67 
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3. Investigation  
Investigation and response began immediately after the first case of FMD was 
identified, but the process was slowed by the fact that the first case identified was not 
actually the original case of infection in the U.K.  By the time response began, the disease 
had begun to spread.  Once the index case was identified as swine on Burnside Farm, the 
investigation was able to focus on the potential origination of FMD.  Investigators 
examined different transmission routes for FMD introduction to the U.K., considering 
transmission by animals, people, vehicles, equipment, vermin, and wildlife.68  However, 
none of these transmission routes appeared viable.  Investigators also considered the 
possibility that FMD was already present within the U.K. and the potential that the 
epidemic resulted from its release.  However, after considering the many alternatives, the 
investigators concluded, “the likeliest source of infection for the pigs on Burnside Farm 
was meat or meat products containing or contaminated with FMD virus and that the virus 
could have been introduced to the pigs through the consumption of such material in 
unprocessed or inadequately processed waste food or the consumption of the processed 
waste food contaminated with such material.” 69   
4. Attribution  
Investigators never definitively determined the cause of the 2001 FMD epidemic 
in the U.K.  The official report on the outbreak concludes: “It will never be possible to 
determine the exact route by which the virus entered the country.”70  Investigators 
believe the FMD was most likely introduced via contaminated meat or meat products that 
were then fed to the pigs at Burnside Farm, but although genetic analysis of the U.K. 
FMD linked it with other outbreaks in Europe and South Africa, further evaluation 
suggested the virus originated in the Far East and was brought to the U.K. in 
contaminated meat or meat products, introduced unintentionally from a contaminated 
source.71 
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5. Financial Impact 
The 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K. was devastating to several sectors of the 
British economy as a result of significant direct and indirect costs.  Direct costs include 
costs of isolation, eradication, decontamination, destruction and disposal of infected 
animals, as well as loss in revenue created by both domestic sales and exports.  
According to U.K. government estimates, “the direct costs for control and eradication of 
the 2001 outbreak was [sic] about $4 billion.”72  The impact on the export markets alone 
cost the U.K. at least $2.4 billion.73  Indirect costs are more difficult to measure because 
these costs deal with ancillary costs affecting consumers, including unemployment 
caused by direct and affiliated industries and decreased consumption of cattle-related 
industries.  As an example of indirect costs, analysts estimated lost tourism revenue cost 
the nation $5 billion, a figure alone higher than the direct costs for eradication of the 
disease, and a nearly 12 percent drop in national tourism revenue.74  
Another impact of a national epidemic that is more difficult to measure is 
consumer confidence.  This confidence can be in the food supply available as well as the 
population’s confidence in the ability of their government to respond and contain an 
incident affecting the nation.  “A survey by the United Kingdom’s Institute of Grocery 
Distribution determined that because of the FMD and mad cow disease outbreaks, many 
consumers in the United Kingdom now consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe.”75   
This concern can have long term impacts on the economy that can be felt for 
years after the direct and indirect costs of the incident itself.  For example, it was not until 
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 also took several years to recover; and to date, the pig revenue has not fully recovered, 
and as of 2006 represented only 85 percent of pre-2001 pork contributions to U.K. GDP 
(see Figure 6).76   
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Figure 6.   U.K. Pig Output, 1999-2006.77 
 
The economic impact of the 2001 FMD epidemic appears significant, and while 
direct costs are estimated at $6.4 billion, indirect costs are harder to estimate.  Overall 
economic impact assessment of the FMD epidemic is unavailable, but there are certainly 
other sectors of the economy not included in the figures above.  However, with a national 
GDP of U.S. $1.4 trillion in 2001, the impact of $11.4 billion represents only a small 
percentage.78.  While specific sectors of the economy were certainly severely affected, 
the nation did not suffer significant economic impact as a whole.  In fact, it is now 
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estimated that the U.K. GDP continued to increase after the FMD epidemic.  U.K. GDP 
increased 2.1 percent in 2002, 2.7 percent in 2003 and 3.3 percent in 2004.79 
6. Analysis 
This case highlights the greatest concern with an outbreak of FMD: its high 
degree of contagion.  This case shows that once a case of FMD is detected a country may 
take swift action and immediately emplace control measures and still find that these 
actions are too late to prevent a national outbreak.  Even when quarantine and movement 
control measures are implemented immediately after the first identification of FMD, as 
they were in the U.K. case, the first diagnosed case may not be the index case, and in any 
case given the highly contagious nature of FMD the index case may already have infected 
numerous other animals.  Additionally, this case shows that the economic impact of 
eradication efforts themselves may be a small fraction of the overall economic impact, 
which includes loss of consumer confidence and loss of revenue from other sectors 
reliance upon cattle, sheep, and swine. 
E. COUNTERFACTUAL U.S. CASE 
1. The U.S. at Risk 
Like many countries with robust livestock populations, the U.S. is at risk of a 
FMD epidemic.  Whether accidentally or deliberately introduced into the country, the 
results would be widespread.  Either path of infection would likely spread quickly, 
infecting cattle, swine, and sheep, and necessitate herd isolation and, in many cases, 
destruction.  The following section will examine U.S. susceptibility of FMD epidemic, 
and the economic impact of such an event. 
Agriculture accounts for 13 percent of the U.S. GDP and 18 percent of domestic 
employment.80  As part of this robust agricultural sector, the U.S. has a significant 
reliance upon cattle, sheep, and swine.  Therefore, the U.S. is very vulnerable to a FMD 
epidemic.  Projections also suggest that a FMD epidemic in the U.S. would have a 
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significant economic impact.  The U.S. produces 26 billion pounds of beef and 22 billion 
pounds of pork, and a FMD outbreak would halt production of beef, pork and sheep in 
the affected regions until the outbreak could be contained.81  According to a USDA 
study, an outbreak in the United States comparable to the one in the U.K. would require 
the destruction of about 13 million animals.82  This represents approximately 13.4 
percent of the nation’s 2006 cattle herd.83  By comparison, the U.K. epidemic led to the 
culling of 4 million animals, representing nearly 36 percent of the U.K. cattle.84   
U.S. vulnerability to a FMD epidemic has grown significantly in recent years, as a 
result of changes in the average size and concentration of the nation’s herds.  Farms 
continue to get larger and more concentrated, with the overall number of farms 
decreasing (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).  This is especially pronounced in cattle 
production.  In 2000, just “2 percent of the nation’s feedlots suppl[ied] three quarters of 
its cattle.”85  The USDA reports a 73 percent reduction in the number of farms between 
1935 and 1997, with large farms (categorized as farms greater than 500 acres) increasing 
to nearly 20 percent of the total number.86  The U.K. experienced a similar change in 
farm structure; between 1967 and 1999, sheep and cattle holdings per farm approximately 
doubled.87  As of 2005, 2 percent of the nation’s feedlots produced more than 70 percent 
of grain-fed beef cattle production and 5 percent of the nation’s feedlots accounted for 
80 - 90 percent.88  Larger farms have evolved as a more efficient means for livestock 
production, but this concentration also increases vulnerability to epidemics. As a result, 
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“deliberate introduction of a highly contagious animal disease in a single feedlot could 
have serious economic consequences.”89   
 




Figure 8.   Distribution of farms by acreage class, 1880-199791 
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2. Outbreak 
If FMD were introduced into the U.S. cattle, pork, or sheep feedlots, it would 
spread quickly.  If the disease were not immediately identified and contained, it would 
likely spread throughout the nation and completely shut down domestic consumption and 
foreign export of all beef, pork, and sheep, along with associated products.  “Some 
experts believe that the virus could travel more than 175 miles on wind currents.”92  The 
ease with which FMD can spread is compounded by farm concentration.  In fact, some 
experts believe an infectious disease such as FMD “could spread to as many as 25 states 
in as little as five days, simply through the regulated movement of animals between farm 
and market.”93  Without immediate containment, this spread would likely create a 
national epidemic like the 2001 case in Britain. 
Because of its high level of contagion, FMD could easily be introduced into the 
U.S. by a terrorist group.  Since “only small amounts are needed, they can be easily 
smuggled into the country with essentially no chance of detection.”94  A sample of the 
virus could be collected from an infected animal in another country and be smuggled into 
the U.S. and used to begin large scale contamination.  In fact, only “a few hundred 
microliters of scrapings from the blistered mucosa of an FMD-infected animal…can 
provide more than enough agent to initiate an epidemic.” 95  Samples could be collected f 
and easily transported to the U.S. simply by smearing the virus on a rag.  The 
contamination could then be initiated at any of the sites discussed above, and the spread 
of the disease would likely be immediate and far-reaching, with tremendous 
consequence. 
Because FMD is a naturally-occurring virus it can appear anywhere in the world.  
Previously FMD-free nations have witnessed its introduction and often the source of the 
virus is never determined (like the U.K. in 2001).  If FMD appeared in the U.S., the 
investigation might end with the same probable hypotheses as the U.K., and assumption 
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that the virus was introduced by accident.  Therefore, even if a terrorist group introduced 
FMD into the U.S. and started an epidemic, it might remain un-attributed indefinitely.  
Only if the group claimed responsibility or authorities found evidence tying the epidemic 
to intentional contamination could attribution occur. 
3. Financial Impact 
A FMD epidemic in the U.S. would have impact on numerous sectors of the U.S. 
economy.  This remains true whether the epidemic was initiated intentionally or the virus 
was introduced accidentally (as the investigators concluded in the U.K.).  The GAO and 
other agencies have evaluated the potential financial impact of a FMD epidemic in the 
U.S.  GAO Report GAO-02-808 concludes the direct and indirect costs of an outbreak 
would be significant.  In 2006 the U.S. produced 70.7 billion pounds of meat animals 
(cattle, sheep, and swine), and had $41 billion in beef sales, $19 billion in dairy sales, and 
$14 in pork sales.96  As an OIE List A disease, FMD would lead to an immediate halt in 
the sale of all of these products and immediate loss of revenues.   
Direct costs of an outbreak are fairly easily measured and quantified.  According 
to the GAO estimate, a FMD epidemic in the U.S. would lead to direct cost for 
eradication of approximately $24 billion.97  Additionally, the loss of export sales would 
cost the U.S. economy between $6 and $10 billion a year “while the United States 
eradicated the disease and until it regained disease-free status.”98  This loss in export 
sales represents approximately 8.7 – 14.6 percent of the U.S. agricultural exports in 
2006.99  Estimates vary, but range from 5 to 10 years before a nation’s exports fully 
recover from an epidemic, and trade resumes normally. 
Indirect costs are more difficult to quantify, and therefore more difficult to 
estimate for a hypothetical epidemic scenario.  A national FMD epidemic would likely 
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lead to “unemployment, loss of income…and decreased economic activity, which could 
ripple through other sectors of the economy as well.”100  Although the GAO and others 
have examined the many sectors that would be impacted by such an event, an accurate 
estimate of this ripple effect has not been accomplished.  Certainly a FMD outbreak 
would not only impact the industries producing beef, port, and mutton, but also the 
industries that support that production: meat-processing facilities, feed suppliers, etc.101  
However, livestock exports represents only a small percentage of the U.S. robust, diverse 
economy (GDP estimated at $13.16 trillion and total exports estimated at $1.023 trillion 
in 2006), and while other sectors of the economy would also be impacted,, a FMD 
epidemic in the U.S. is unlikely to shake the economic foundation of the nation. 102  
4. Psychological Impact 
Although the economic impact of a FMD outbreak is relatively easy to measure, 
and even to estimate, an even more important measurement is the public’s reaction and 
loss in confidence as a result.  This loss of confidence could be in the safety of the food 
supply, confidence in the cattle, sheep and swine industries’ ability to safeguard their 
herds and identify illness in their animals, and in the government’s ability to respond 
quickly and effectively to contain and eradicate the disease.  Finally, this loss in 
confidence likely extends to the international community’s judgment of the safety of the 
affected country’s exports.  If the epidemic were attributed to terrorists, or a group 
claimed responsibility, the psychological impact of the outbreak would be even more 
substantial. 
In the U.K. FMD epidemic, the psychological impacts were significant.  Those 
directly affected by the outbreak experienced symptoms including “tearfulness, lack of 
sleep, loss of appetite, increased anger irritability, … general depression…[and] an 
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increase in marital discord.”103  The general public was also affected by the reduced 
availability of food products, confidence in the food supply, and witnessing eradication 
efforts throughout the country.  Although the British government took pains to minimize 
the impact, the public was exposed to huge funeral pyres and mountains of animal 
carcasses awaiting disposal.   
In the U.S., the psychological impact would likely be similar.  Those directly 
employed or involved with the livestock sector would face the same stressors as their 
British counterparts.  The general public would also be faced with reduced meat products 
and concerns with safety of the food supply.  If investigation led to the conclusion the 
epidemic was accidental, attention might focus on improving detection and response 
actions.  However, if the epidemic was attributed to intentional contamination, the public 
would likely lose confidence in the safety of the national food supply, and more 
importantly, the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard a major sector of the nation.  
The sight of piles of carcasses, mass burials, and huge funeral pyres would highlight U.S. 
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined FMD and the U.S. focus on prevention and detection, and 
then response and investigation.  The U.K. FMD case study serves to highlight the 
vulnerability of livestock to FMD, and how even an unintentional introduction of the 
disease can rapidly spread and cause destruction of the nation’s herds.  Additionally, the 
case study shows the importance of immediate isolation and response, and the severity of 
repercussions of failing to establish immediate containment.  U.S. and U.K. capabilities 
to detect FMD are similar, and the 2001 FMD epidemic in the U.K. clearly shows any 
delays in containment of FMD can be catastrophic.  Although the U.S. has systems in 
place to identify FMD, they are likely to be ineffective in preventing a nation-wide 
epidemic.   
A U.S. outbreak of FMD (either accidental or intentional) would cause damage to 
the economy reaching billions of dollars.  Long term impacts would also be significant as 
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the world placed embargos on American products.  Trade deficits would create ripple 
effects in other sectors of the economy, and while remaining a fraction of the GDP, are 
not insignificant, especially in the livestock and associated support sectors of the 
economy.  While the psychological repercussions of a FMD attack would impact both the 
American public and the international community, the number of human casualties would 
most likely remain negligible.   
The U.S. detection and response systems are likely to act too slowly to contain a 
nation-wide FMD epidemic.  As in the U.K. case, by the time the first infection is 
detected, the virus could have already spread undetected.  If the U.S. detection and 
response systems are likely to fail in preventing a nation-wide FMD epidemic, how then, 
can one measure a terrorist’s motivations to conduct an agroterror attack using FMD and 
how would the impact of such an attack would be viewed in the context of escalation?  
This chapter has laid the foundation on which the answers to these questions will be 
addressed in Chapter IV. 
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III. 2006 SALINAS ESCHERICHIA COLI (E. COLI) SPINACH 
OUTBREAK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2006, a nation-wide E. coli outbreak that would cause nearly 200 
people to fall ill and kill at least three was identified.  Investigation would link the E. coli 
to contaminated spinach originating from the Salinas Valley region of California.  This 
contamination would have a direct economic impact on the region and lead to a nation-
wide decrease in consumer confidence in the safety of the nation’s spinach and bagged 
salad.  As soon as the contamination was identified, national response mechanisms were 
put into place, an investigation initiated, and efforts to mitigate the impact were begun.104   
This chapter will examine the U.S. identification and response to food-borne 
contamination using the Salinas E. coli outbreak to evaluate the timeliness and overall 
effectiveness of the process.  An examination of U.S. epidemiology, the process by which 
a food-borne contamination and resulting human illness is identified, will enable a clear 
understanding of the mechanisms used to identify food-borne illnesses.  Next, the Salinas 
case study will highlight how federal and state agencies respond to outbreaks of food 
contamination to minimize further illness, locate and isolate the source, and work to 
reassure the public on the safety of their food.  Next, the financial impact of this naturally 
occurring outbreak will be assessed to facilitate counter-factual case development for a 
multi-crop terror attack using E. coli.  
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B. EPIDEMIOLOGY  
“Speed of detection depends on successful medical surveillance.”105 
1. Detection 
Epidemiology refers to the preventive processes in place in a community to 
detect, identify, and respond to illness or disease.  It becomes an integral component of 
biological terrorism response, because illnesses may appear and begin to spread well 
before it becomes known that they are caused by anything other than natural causes.  
Whether naturally occurring, or as a result of covert terrorist attack, people with 
symptoms of an illness will traditionally present themselves to either their doctor or an 
emergency room for treatment.106   Because even people in the same community will 
likely have different doctors or be seen in different hospitals, a system is in place to 
ensure individual cases can be aggregated to show larger trends of illness in a single 
location or across the nation.  An additional complication is the initial ambiguity of 
symptoms that may be presented; covert biological attacks would most likely mimic 
natural illness.107  After initial diagnosis, reporting and coordination from the local to the 
national level becomes a complex matrix of agencies and responsibilities (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 9.   The National Detection System.108 
 
Although the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) bears overall responsibility 
for tracking disease or illness outbreaks throughout the country, without detailed 
reporting from communities across the country, this difficult task would be truly 
impossible.  To make a diagnosis, “a patient must seek medical attention, the physician 
must decide to order diagnostic tests, and the laboratory must use the appropriate 
procedures.”109  Once the physician makes a reportable diagnosis, the illness is reported 
to local and state health departments who coordinate with the CDC.  The CDC acts in 
concert with all the state health departments to collect surveillance information on food-
borne illnesses to determine if there are disease outbreaks.  
In identifying a widespread outbreak of illness, whether caused naturally or by 
covert terrorist attack, clinics, doctors, and emergency rooms are given guidance on what 
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types of illnesses warrant upward reporting to the state or CDC (see Figure 10 and 
Figure 11).  To respond to a national epidemic, there must be cooperation and 
communication between local, state, and national agencies.  First, the illness must be 
          
Figure 10.   Epidemiologic Principles.110 
 
identified and victims treated, then the source must be found and isolated.  Finally, any 
deficiencies in safeguards must be identified and corrected.  An agroterror attack could 
differ from a natural incident only discretely, so it is crucial that health care professionals 
are able to recognize these crucial factors.  Factors that would facilitate identification of 
an epidemic are called epidemiological principles (see Figure 10) and additional data that 
can help determine if the epidemic is the result of agroterrorism are called 
epidemiological clues (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Epidemiologic Clues That May Signal a Covert Bioterrorism 
Attack.111 
 
2. Epidemiological Systems 
Although epidemiology and disease reporting is a complex process, there are 
several systems that have been implemented to assure information flow and incident 
response capability.  These systems facilitate communication between the primary care 
providers across the nation and the local, state, and federal agencies that have the 
resources and mandate to respond to a disease outbreak.  While the primary care 
                                                 
111 From Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “The Public Health Response to 
Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials,” 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/Planning/PlanningGuidance.PDF (accessed October 15, 2007), 17. 
38 
providers continue to treat the patients already infected, this response is aimed at 
identifying the source of the outbreak to prevent further infections, investigation into the 
cause of the contamination, and measures to prevent further occurrences or an evaluation 
of current processes designed to mitigate disease. 
The PulseNet system is “a national network of public health and food regulatory 
agency laboratories coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC).  The network consists of state health departments, local health departments, and 
federal agencies (CDC, USDA/FSIS, FDA).”112  PulseNet not only consolidates 
reporting of epidemiologic indicators, but its members perform “standardized molecular 
subtyping (or fingerprinting) of foodborne disease-causing bacteria,” enabling the precise 
identification of strains of organisms at the genetic level.113  Such a comparison enables 
the CDC and other agencies to identify potential nation-wide outbreaks precisely, and 
eliminate similar, but non-identical illnesses.  “The strength of this system is its ability to 
identify patterns even if the affected persons are geographically far apart, which is 
important given the reality of U.S. food distribution systems.”114  For example, based on 
a 1999 estimate, 73,000 infections and 61 deaths occur in the United States each year 
from E. coli.115  However, because E. coli is a naturally occurring organism, there must 
be a method of discerning natural or isolated occurrences from deliberate or “common 
source” contaminations.  Typing to the genetic level allows the CDC to identify specific 
strains of an organism such as E. coli to determine if the source of multiple illnesses can 
be isolated and attributed to intentional causes.   
A related network called OutbreakNet allows the data collected by PulseNet to be 
shared and acted upon.  OutbreakNet is a network of “public health epidemiologists at the 
local, state, and federal levels who investigate foodborne and diarrheal disease 
outbreaks.”116  Member epidemiologists use the information obtained and maintained in 
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PulseNet to identify and investigate suspected outbreaks of specific organisms.  As a 
result of the information gathered through OutbreakNet, “tracing the implicated food 
back from consumption through preparation, to distributors, and sometimes back to a 
field or farm can help determine how the contamination occurred, stop distribution of the 
contaminated product, and prevent further outbreaks from occurring.”117   
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) is “the principal 
foodborne disease component of CDC's Emerging Infections Program (EIP).  FoodNet is 
a collaborative project of the CDC, ten EIP sites, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).”118  FoodNet enables active 
surveillance to identify occurrence of foodborne disease and identify specific sources of 
contamination.  Although FoodNet offers robust capability, it is not active across the 
nation.  In fact, as of 2004, only 10 states were participating in the program and the 
bacterial catchment area covered 44.5 million persons, only 15.1% of the United States 
population.119  
There are two primary information systems that facilitate expedited reporting and 
information dissemination from the CDC to state health organizations.  First, the Health 
Alert Network (HAN) is a “nationwide information and communication system that 
serves as a platform for the distribution of health alerts and prevention guidelines, 
distance learning, national disease surveillance and electronic laboratory reporting, and 
other initiatives to strengthen state and local preparedness.”120  Second, the Epidemic 
Information Exchange (EPI-X) is the CDC’s “secure, web-based communications 
network that serves as a powerful communications exchange between CDC, state and 
local health departments, poison control centers, and other public health professionals. 
The system provides rapid reporting, immediate notification, editorial support, and 
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coordination of health investigations for public health professionals.”121  EPI-X allows 
the primary care providers and other reporting agencies the opportunity to consolidate 
reporting information to a centralized database that can be shared with other providers 
and response agencies. 
3. Response and Investigation 
“By the time people go to the hospital, an epidemic could have already 
broken out.”122 
Once an outbreak has been identified, the CDC and other government agencies 
activate incident response mechanisms.  These measures can be as simple as a general 
health warning to the public, or can be as robust as a complete food type or specific 
product recall.  In situations that lead to recalls of food, the CDC and the FDA coordinate 
actions to notify affected industries, as well as alert the public.  These alerts are made 
through systems such as HAN and EPI-X, as well as through public access conduits such 
as the media. 
Additionally, as part of the response, these agencies work to determine the cause 
of the outbreak, and whether the contamination was natural or intentional.  This portion 
of the investigation is called attribution, and can be the most difficult stage of any 
investigation, because of the nature of illness caused by agricultural contamination.123  
“Common and naturally occurring pathogens and the infections they create raise little 
medical suspicion and are not assumed to be the weapon of choice for terrorists.”124  
Only when large numbers of the same type of illness are reported and the same strain of 
bacteria is identified can a determination be made that there is probably an outbreak.  
Immediate investigation into the source of the contamination is vital.  A law enforcement 
response to a suspected deliberate contamination requires careful consideration of 
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evidence collection, such as compliance with rules of evidence to include chain of 
custody concerns for later prosecution.  However, since deliberate contaminations would 
likely mimic a natural outbreak initially, the law enforcement response might not occur 
immediately.  This leads to additional challenges related to evidence contamination and 
loss, and increases the difficulty of identifying the contaminator(s) when the initial 
response is a purely medical one. 
C.  CASE STUDY 
1. Reporting 
The 2006 Spinach E. coli outbreak is a useful case study in evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of U.S. systems used to identify, respond and manage 
outbreaks of food borne illnesses.  This outbreak demonstrated that a food-source 
contamination can be identified, that local, state and federal agencies can respond in a 
coordinated fashion, and the public can be quickly notified, the product isolated, and 
overall casualties minimized.  However, this case also shows the greatest weakness in the 
system: the identification of contamination after the first people become ill, but before it 
becomes an epidemic. 
The PulseNet system was instrumental in the identification of the 2006 E. coli 
outbreak.  On September 8, 2006, it facilitated identification of the first cluster of 
illnesses attributable to E. coli in Wisconsin.  On September 13, a second cluster was 
identified in Oregon, along with additional potential cases in several other states.  By 
September 14, fresh spinach had been implicated as the source of illness, and 50 cases 
were reported.  On September 14, the public health community was notified of the 
outbreak via HAN and EPI-X, and by September 15, the U.S. media began relaying the 
warning to the public not to eat fresh spinach.125  Contaminated spinach later determined 
to have been processed on August 14 caused illnesses that would spread across the 
nation.  By September 16, 2006, 102 persons were identified as infected with the  
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outbreak strain of E. coli O157:H7.  Of these, 52 were hospitalized, 16 developed kidney 
failure called hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS), and 1 person died.  Illnesses were 
reported from 19 states. 126 
One of the greatest challenges with identifying food borne illness is the victim’s 
reporting time from ingestion of the contaminant to onset of symptoms and seeking 
medical attention (see Figure 12).  If numerous people are exposed to a bacterium such as 
E. coli at the same time (as in this example, consuming spinach from the same batch 
harvested, bagged and sold around the same time), by the time they all seek medical 
attention and samples are submitted for analysis, large numbers of people could have 
already been sickened.  
 
Figure 12.   CDC’s Estimated Timeline for Reporting of Cases127 
 
It is important to note that the first infection was determined to have occurred on 
August 19; however, the first determination that there was an outbreak was not made 
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until September 8.128  While Figure 13 shows a dramatic cluster of illnesses centered on 
August 31, E. coli sicknesses caused by Salinas contaminated spinach actually covered a 
much greater period.  By the end of the outbreak in early October, 199 persons had been 
reported infected by E. coli O157:H7, of which 102 had been hospitalized, 31 developed 
HUS, and 3 died.129   
 
Figure 13.   Number of confirmed cases (N = 171) of E. coli serotype O157:H7 
infection, by date of illness onset, reported as of September 26, 2006.130 
 
2. Response  
As soon as the initial outbreak was identified, the CDC and FDA issued a blanket 
health warning against consumption of fresh spinach.  Initial information was insufficient 
to allow more specific warnings, so the federal agencies opted for the most conservative 
approach: a comprehensive warning.  On September 14, the FDA advised the public not 
                                                 
128 CDC, “Multiple States Investigating a Large Outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 Infections, September 
14, 2006,” http://www2a.cdc.gov/HAN/ArchiveSys/ViewMsgV.asp?AlertNum=00249 (accessed October 
3, 2007). 
129 CDC, “Update on Multi-State Outbreak of E. coli.”  
130 From CDC, “Ongoing Multistate Outbreak Of Escherichia Coli Serotype O157:H7 Infections 
Associated With Consumption Of Fresh Spinach --- United States, September 26, 2006,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm55d926a1.htm (accessed October 17, 2007). 
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to eat bagged fresh spinach, but then revised the warning on September 15 to cover all 
fresh spinach or salad blends containing spinach.131  Within days, supermarkets across 
the nation pulled spinach from their shelves.  Additionally, by September 21, 2006, three 
companies initiated voluntary recalls of their spinach products: Natural Selection Foods 
of Salinas (September 15), River Ranch of Salinas (September 17), and RLB Food 
Distributors of West Caldwell, New Jersey (September 19).132  This response by the 
CDC and FDA was nearly immediate, and showed the successful interagency 
coordination and response.  However, as Figure 13.   shows, the number of illnesses 
being reported had dropped significantly by the time these agencies began their response.  
Although the data in Figure 13 ends the day the recall begins, the trend of infections was 
clearly decreasing by the time the CDC and FDA responded.  In fact, over the next three 
weeks, only 18 more people became ill from spinach, an average of less than one per day.   
3. Investigation 
In the case of the Salinas spinach contamination, the process of tracing the 
contamination back to its source was accomplished quickly.  Almost immediately after 
identification of the second outbreak (in Oregon), investigators were able to determine 
the source of the contamination: bagged spinach from the Salinas Valley, California.  “A 
contaminated bag of Dole baby spinach found Wednesday [September 13, 2006] at the 
New Mexico home of a person who fell ill helped investigators focus in on the source of 
the current E. coli scare.”133  Investigators were able to use this specific bag to trace the 
product back to its source.  Once California produce was identified, the California Food 
Emergency Response Team (CalFERT) was notified and on September 14 an 
investigative team arrived in Salinas.134 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 Patricia Griffin, Karl Klontz, Phillip Tarr, “COCA Conference Call—E. coli O157:H7 Outbreak 
(September 21, 2006),” http://www.bt.cdc.gov/coca/summaries/pdf/E_coli_Sept_21_2006final.pdf 
(accessed September 28, 2007). 
133 “Feds: New Safety Plan Required Before Spinach Is Sold,” NBC, September 11, 2006, 
http://www.nbc11.com/news/9903292/detail.html (accessed October 16, 2007). 
134 For a detailed analysis of the investigation, refer to CA Department of Health Services and U.S. 
FDA , “Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak.” 
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While the initial best information was generic with respect to the source of 
contamination (fresh spinach), as the investigation progressed authorities were able to 
narrow the source after a process of ‘tracebacks,’ in which “records are collected 
sequentially to elucidate the path of product associated with illness to travel from the 
point of consumer purchase all the way back, ideally, to the production side.”135  As a 
result of this vigorous process, by September 18, 2006, it was determined that all brands 
of spinach linked to the outbreak were grown in Salinas, California.  As a result of this 
information, the FDA revised its health warning and advised against eating spinach from 
three specific counties in California.136 
4. Attribution 
The cause of the 2006 E. coli outbreak in spinach remains unknown.  
Investigators concluded: “No definitive determination could be made regarding how 
E. coli O157:H7 pathogens contaminated spinach in this outbreak.”137  California 
authorities believe it was a natural occurrence, most probably caused by contamination of 
the spinach in the fields.  “Potential environmental risk factors for E. coli O157:H7 
contamination identified during this investigation included the presence of wild pigs in 
and around spinach fields and the proximity of irrigation wells used for ready-to-eat 
produce to surface waterways exposed to feces from cattle and wildlife.”138   
5.  Financial Impact  
The Salinas Valley region of California is commonly called “America’s Salad 
Bowl.”  According to the California Farm Bureau Federation approximately 74 percent of 
the fresh-market spinach grown in the U.S. comes from California.139  As will be 
discussed below, regional concentration of a specific crop has both positive and negative 
effects.  Positively, this concentration enables authorities to quickly identify the source of 
                                                 
135 Griffin et al. 
136 CDC, “What CDC and Other Agencies Did.” 
137 CA Department of Health Services and U.S. FDA , “Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 
Outbreak.” 
138 Ibid. 
139 “Markets, Restaurants Pull Popular Spinach Greens from Shelves, Menus,” Knight-Ridder Tribune 
Business News, September 19, 2006. 
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any contamination, respond, and isolate the crop.  However, regional concentration can 
exacerbate the resulting economic hardship.  In the Salinas E. coli case, even though the 
spinach contamination was eventually isolated, the entire Salinas Valley spinach industry 
was initially implicated and bore the brunt of the immediate economic costs as the 
contaminated crops were pulled from the shelves, and the linger costs of consumer 
backlash.   
Within Monterey County spinach is an important crop, sold both by itself and as 
an additive to bagged salads.  With 2005 sales exceeding $188 million, spinach accounts 
for approximately 5% of the region’s $3.4 billion agricultural output.140  Additionally, as 
a result of spinach becoming an integral part of packaged salads, spinach sales increased 
nearly 36 percent from 2002 to 2005.141  Total 2005 bagged salad sales from Monterey 
County topped $132 million.142 
The August 2006 E. coli contamination had significant impact on the economy of 
the region.  According to figures released by the Perishables Group, “sales figures 
through Dec. 23 from 16,000 conventional supermarkets, not including big-box stores 
such as Wal-Mart or Costco, showed an overall 14 percent drop in spinach sales [from 
the previous year]…bulk spinach dropped by nearly half and even packaged salad 
without spinach dropped about 10 percent.143  Only once the contamination was 
contained and spinach returned to the shelves was the economic impact of the incident 
able to be assessed.  According to the 2006 Monterey County Crop Report, 2006 sales of 




                                                 
140 California Department of Food and Agriculture, “Monterey County Crop Report 2006,” 
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/ag/pdfs/cropreport2006.pdf (accessed October 18, 2007). 
141 Kate Forgach, “Latest Food-Safety Scare Hits Local Growers Hard,” Northern Colorado Business 
Report, September 29, 2006. 
142 California Department of Food and Agriculture, “Monterey County Crop Report 2006.” 
143 Janet Frankston Lorin, “Consumers Still Worried About Spinach after E. coli Contamination,” The 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, February 4, 2007. 
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million from the previous year.144  Jim Bogart, president of the Grower-Shipper 
Association believes the full economic impact on local agriculture likely won't be known 
until 2008.145 
The direct short term impact can and has been measured, but the loss in consumer 
confidence and long term impact has yet to be realized.  In fact, some analysts believe it 
may take a full five years for the spinach market to recover from the damage it suffered 
from the E. coli scare.146  Sales of salad mix dropped by approximately 50 percent after 
the September E. coli outbreak, and took months to recover.  In February 2007, the sales 
for mixed salads rose to only about 75 percent of its previous levels, and conventionally 
grown bunched spinach were about 80 percent of previous sales.147  Unless and until 
consumer confidence is restored, the region will continue to be adversely affected by the 
ripples of the September 2006 outbreak.  However, while regionally this loss remains 
significant, it represents only a fraction of the $10.2 billion generated annually from the 
vegetable sector (top 35 vegetables).148 
6. Analysis  
While this case shows that systems in place within the U.S. are effective in 
collecting and conveying trend information to national agencies such as the CDC and 
FDA, it also highlights the greatest system vulnerability; identifying illnesses before they 
become an epidemic.  This case shows that while the national systems may adequately 
report the illnesses, they are only activated after people begin to report their illnesses, and 
the mechanisms only begin to respond when clusters of illnesses appear.  In fact, in this 
case, the majority of the people who got sick as a result of eating contaminated spinach 
did so before the nation was able to identify that there was even a problem and before the 
national response system was initiated.  Although one might think this it is good that the 
                                                 
144 California Department of Food and Agriculture, “Monterey County Crop Report 2006.” 
145 “What Will '07 Bring?” The Californian, January 1, 2007. 
146 Greg Edwards, “Virginia Spinach Growers Hopeful Their Harvest Finds A Market,” Richmond 
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147 Lorin. 
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Vegetables,” http://www.nass.usda.gov/QuickStats/Create_Federal_All.jsp (accessed October 19, 2007). 
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number of people who got sick during the response phase is low, the reduction in illness 
was not due to any concerted effort, but rather to the fact that the contaminated bagged 
spinach reached its best-by date and became largely unavailable for consumption.  The 
first cluster of illnesses was identified on September 8, 2006, by which time the majority 
of people who would be sickened in the outbreak had already consumed contaminated 
spinach and become symptomatic.  By the time the nation-wide alert and recall were 
initiated (September 14), 171 of the 199 infections had already occurred.  Thus, while it 
is possible that the recall prevented further infections, the distribution of illnesses shows 
that the number of prevented infections was at best very small.  Figure 13.  shows that the 
number of illnesses was decreasing by the time the first and second clusters were 
identified, and as the trend continued, dropped to an average of less than one per day until 
the contaminated spinach was no longer in supply channels and the last case was 
reported.  Effectively, the data indicates even without a concerted response by health 
agencies to warn consumers of the contamination, the illnesses would likely have 
continued to decrease until they reached zero as the contaminated spinach naturally 
disappeared from the market.  What epidemiology accomplished in this case was to 
facilitate the response, investigative, and attribution phases, enabling the FDA to initiate 
food warnings, and working toward helping the public regain confidence in the food 
supply.  Even though the warnings were realistically superficial, they led the nation to 
believe the FDA was doing something about a national health problem.  
Although the epidemiologic investigation can be laborious, the response phase to 
widespread food contamination can be initiated very quickly.  In the Salinas spinach case 
the response was immediate and effective.  Within one day of the identification of the 
second cluster of illnesses, a nation-wide health warning was published, supermarkets 
were pulling spinach from their shelves, and three large spinach companies had initiated 
voluntary recalls.  Investigators worked with the victims to identify common 
consumption items and had narrowed the production are to a relatively small region in 
California.  An investigative team was dispatched to the suspect area and the 
investigation phase began. 
The investigation into the source of the E. coli in this case, while thorough, was 
ultimately inconclusive.  Careful examination of harvesting methods as well as the 
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processing and packaging procedures seemed to eliminate the likelihood of post-
harvesting contamination.  Investigators concluded that environmental factors led to the 
contamination, most likely wild animals in the area, nearby cattle, or contaminated 
groundwater, and that there was no wrong-doing or lapse in protocols by any of the 
companies involved.  However, no definitive source could be identified.  This suggests 
that in isolated cases of contamination attribution is difficult.  While the investigative 
agencies’ conclusion that the Salinas contamination occurred naturally seems reasonable, 
it could be that this incident was in fact intentional, perhaps even a terrorist group’s test 
of the national response and/or an effort to gauge the effectiveness of a more significant 
attack such as the one modeled in the counterfactual case below. 
D. COUNTERFACTUAL U.S. CASE 
1. The U.S. at Risk 
The Salinas E. coli case is an example of a single-crop contamination that had 
significant financial repercussions regionally.  In the context of the overall U.S. GDP, the 
impact was negligible.  However, based on this actual case it is possible to model a multi-
crop counterfactual case and then to evaluate the likely financial impact of an intentional 
multi-crop contamination.  Spinach is only one of many crops that are geographically 
concentrated in specific regions of the U.S. (see Figure 14).  California alone produces 
the majority of the nation’s vegetable production.  According to the USDA, in 2006 
California produced over 52 percent of the nation’s top ten vegetables (see Figure 15) and 
51.3 percent of the top 34 vegetables produced in the U.S. (see Figure 16).149 
                                                 
149 USDA, “Quick Stats, U.S. & All States Data – Vegetables.” 
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Figure 14.    Vegetables, Acres Harvested for Sale, 2002.150 
 
























































































































































































Figure 15.   Value of Production; US Top 10 Vegetable Crops151 
 
                                                 
150 From USDA, “Vegetables,” http://www.nass.usda.gov/research/atlas02/pdf/02-M241-RGBDot1-
largetext.pdf, (accessed November 14, 2007). 
151 After Ibid. 
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Figure 16.   Value of Production; US Top 34 Vegetable Crops152 
 
Along with spinach, California also leads the nation in the production of lettuce, 
producing between 77 and 89 of combined lettuce and spinach earnings in 2006 (see 
Figure 17).  Total U.S. lettuce and spinach crops were valued at over $2 billion in 2006 
(see Figure 18), which makes them collectively a potentially lucrative target for a terrorist 
organization wishing to inflict significant economic and psychological damage upon the 
U.S. This counter-factual case will consider the likely effects of a simultaneous attack on 
the main three types of lettuce (leaf, romaine, and head) long with spinach.   
                                                 




















































































































Figure 17.   Spinach and Lettuce Percentage of Production153 
 
Commodity 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Lettuce  
Head  177.40 174.60 65.75 58.69 1,019,218 976,923
Leaf  64.60 71.10 15.89 17.15 530,708 599,222
Romaine  60.40 61.00 19.93 19.81 386,291 427,796
Spinach 45.70 45.60 7.58 6.21 172,114 181,765
 Total  348.10 352.30 109.15 101.86 2,108,331 2,185,706
1/ Crop value from 2004 forward is based on grower prices
Harvested area--1,000 acres Production--Million cwt Crop value--$1,000 1/
 
Figure 18.   Fresh vegetables: U.S. area, production, and crop value, 2005-2006154 
 
Because the three lettuce crops and spinach are all highly concentrated in 
California, they also pose attractive targets in terms of ease of access.  Contaminants 
could easily be introduced by either a lone individual, or more likely several members of 
an organization acting in concert.  The contaminants could be introduced simultaneously 
or within days of each other.  In either case, the crop contamination would likely follow 
                                                 
153 After USDA, “USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service - Quick Stats, U.S. & All States Data 
– Vegetables.” 
154 After Ibid. 
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the course of the Salinas outbreak.  In an alternate scenario, contamination could be 
introduced in recurring intervals, varying either types of crops or originating locations.  
Each of these recurring contaminations would follow the same pattern, but the overall 
impact would be more significant than a single outbreak. 
2. Outbreak 
As in the Salinas spinach contamination, a combined spinach and lettuce 
contamination would likely be characterized by clusters of illnesses throughout the U.S.  
Since California produce represents the lion’s share of both spinach and lettuce, it is 
shipped and consumed throughout the nation.  Produce contaminated even at only a few 
originating sites would likely be transported to different states, and sicken those eating it.   
Spinach production in 2006 yielded 6.21 million cwt (cwt = hundred weight = one 
hundred pounds).  This represents 6.10 percent of the total spinach and lettuce crop for 
2006.  If lettuce and spinach were contaminated at the same percentage and distributed 
throughout the country, worst case contamination would follow the same percentages.  If 
the number of casualties in the Salinas E. coli case is estimated to be 6.10 percent of the 
casualties for a multi-crop contamination, an estimated 3264 people could fall ill and 49 
people die from E. coli in spinach and lettuce.155  Because fresh lettuce and spinach are 
shipped quickly throughout the nation and consumed while fresh, these illnesses would 
likely occur in many different areas; however, the rate of illnesses would likely follow 
the same pattern as the Salinas E. coli case.  The first cases of illness would appear nearly 
immediately, with the peak reaching over 400 people ill approximately two weeks 
later.156  Although these illnesses would appear throughout the nation, they would likely 
be reported in clusters, and enter the nation’s epidemiological systems in similar fashion 
to the Salinas case. 
Because the first line of detection is at the local level, namely primary physicians, 
emergency rooms, and the like, the increased reporting burden would be dispersed 
                                                 
155 If spinach at 6.21 million cwt is 6.10% of the total spinach and lettuce production, then assuming 
199 ill and 3 dead are 6.10% of the total casualties for a multi-crop outbreak, one can estimate 3264 people 
ill and 49 dead. 
156 In the Salinas case, 25 people were reported ill at the peak of the illnesses, 13 days after the first 
case (see Figure 13.  ).  This represents 12.5% of the total ill during the outbreak. 
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through the different locations, and would most likely be manageable.  As highlighted in 
the CDC “Epidemiologic Clues That May Signal a Covert Bioterrorism Attack” chart 
(Figure 11) an increase in case reporting would likely lead to an early identification of the 
intentional nature of the contamination, initiating an early law enforcement response.  
However, with a multi-crop contamination, there would likely be confusion in the 
investigation phase of the response.  In the Salinas case, it was a relatively quick process 
of identifying the source, as all the victims were determined to have eaten bagged spinach 
or salad containing spinach.  In this counter-factual case, the victims would all report 
eating lettuce or spinach, but also a host of other foods.  In fact, the investigators might 
initially discount spinach and lettuce as the cause of illness as not all those sickened 
would report eating either.   
If the contamination were repeated in intervals, additional casualties could be 
expected.  However, each subsequent contamination would likely be less significant, for 
two reasons.  First, as shown in the Salinas case, consumption of the affected food would 
already have decreased, and thus fewer people would be exposed.  Second, people dying 
as a result of contaminated food would likely decrease dramatically as the public would 
be more prone to seek medical treatment at the first sign of symptoms as general 
awareness of food-borne illnesses would be heightened.  While the first outbreak would 
follow the pattern outlined above, subsequent cases would have a steeply decreasing 
curve for both people sickened and killed by the contamination. 
In the Salinas case, once the illnesses were linked to food products, identification 
of not only the specific food but also the originating location was nearly immediate.  This 
allowed the response team to begin the investigation into the suspected farms.  In the 
multi-crop outbreak hypothesized here, the identification of the source of contamination 
would likely not be as quick.  The increase in illnesses and diversity of food consumed 
would increase the effort required to identify the source.  However, once E. coli was 
identified as the cause, the resulting response would more likely include a law 
enforcement contingent, something lacking in the Salinas case.  This additional piece of 
the response would facilitate evidence collection and incident attribution.   
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Although there might be initial challenges in identifying the sources of 
contamination, the Salinas E. coli case shows an outbreak of this type will largely run its 
course with or without government response.  This observation holds true for both the 
one time multi-crop scenario and serial contaminations over time. 
3. Financial Impact 
For the purpose of this estimate, simple extrapolation will be used based upon the 
Salinas case to estimate the overall impact of an intentional, multi-crop contamination of 
spinach and the three types of lettuce examined above. 
In 2006 the U.S. spinach crop had a value of nearly $182 million, and suffered a 
$77 million loss as a result of the Salinas contamination.  This represents a 42.3 percent 
loss in revenue.  For this same period leaf, romaine, and head lettuce crops had a value of 
over $2 billion, with the majority of the market coming from head lettuce.  Combined 
with spinach, these leafy vegetables had a combined value of $2,185,706,000.  Applying 
a 42.3 percent loss to the 2006 crop values of leaf, romaine, and head lettuce and spinach 
leads to an estimated total loss of at least $924.56 million.  Additionally, because of the 
probable delays in identifying the sources of contamination, initial releases from the FDA 
might warn against fresh produce consumption until the definitive sources were 
identified.  The resulting consumer backlash would likely impact other sectors of the 
economy as well.  While this secondary economic impact is harder to estimate, these 
additional affects cannot be discounted. 
If the market share in California is applied to determine a correlating loss based 
on a decrease in California revenues, the percentages of lettuce and spinach produced in 
California need to be compared with the crop values.  In 2006 California spinach 
represented 76.25 percent of the spinach produced in the U.S, and was valued at $138.6 
million (see Figure 17).  Although all spinach manufacturers were initially impacted by 
the spinach recall in the days after the announcement of the contamination in Salinas, the 
overall impact to spinach growers outside the California area was less significant than the 
impact to California growers.  If one applies the percentage of spinach grown in 
California and applies the market loss to that market share ($77 million out of $138.6 
million), a 55.56 percent loss is determined.  Applying this percentage to the lettuce 
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values produces a different, but similar, estimate in loss.  A 55.56 percent loss to the 
California share of the market leads to a total estimated loss in excess of $970 million 
(see Figure 19).  With the caveat that the margin of error in these calculations could be  








 Expected Loss per 
Crop
($K) 
Spinach 138,600 55.56% 77,000.00$                
Head 748,000 55.56% 415,555.56$              
Leaf 532,980 55.56% 296,100.00$              
Romaine 326,592 55.56% 181,440.00$              
Total Value 1,746,172 55.56% 970,095.56$               
Figure 19.   Estimation of California Crop Value and Estimated Loss 
 
significant, this counter-factual multi-crop intentional contamination would lead to a 
$925 to $970 million loss in agricultural revenues within the U.S.  If the contamination 
was recurring, the loss would clearly increase.  Although the effects of each repetition of 
the contamination would be significantly lower than the one before it, repeated outbreaks 
of E. coli would lead to long term consumer distrust in the safety of produce (especially 
spinach and lettuce), and would likely decimate its sale.  One could expect revenue from 
spinach and lettuce to be nearly non-existent until the government and industry took steps 
and implemented programs to monitor the safety of the crop.157  One could expect a total 
loss of fresh spinach and lettuce revenues as long as the attacks continued, which would 
mean a loss of approximately $1.7 billion annually. 
4. Psychological Impact 
As with the previous case study, even more important that the direct financial 
impact of this contamination is the public’s reaction and resulting loss in confidence in 
the safety of the food supply.  While this latter impact is harder to measure than direct 
dollar costs, it is likely a key factor in the outcome of this counter-factual case.   
                                                 
157 For discussion of government and industry partnership in regulating agricultural safety, refer to C. 
Paul Young’s unpublished Master’s Thesis, “Method Or Madness:  Federal Oversight Structures for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007. 
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There has been much written on public reaction to unconventional attacks, and the 
Anthrax attacks of 2001 serve as an example of public reaction to such an event.  
According to Dr. Shulamith Kreitler, the public can be expected to respond to an incident 
of an unconventional (biological or chemical) attack with fear, helplessness, 
vulnerability, and grief or sadness.158  This is manifested in various ways, and after the 
anthrax letters, the public responded dramatically.  “The nation was thrown into an 
unwarranted frenzy of fear, and huge quantities of antibiotics were swallowed 
unnecessarily. Government and private buildings were closed for weeks, and one large 
post office in Washington didn’t reopen for almost a year and a half, and some employees 
refuse to work there even now.”159  People across the country rushed out to buy duct tape 
and sheets of plastic to seal their homes in case of a dramatic airborne anthrax attack.  In 
fact, some believe the public’s over-reaction is more dangerous than the attack itself.  
“[J]udging from the reaction to the anthrax situation, they [the public] are more in danger 
of scaring themselves into immobility than dying from an attack that will probably never 
come…”160   
This reaction was not only seen in response to the Anthrax attacks, but also after 
the Salinas E. coli outbreak.  After the period of contamination, the public showed some 
reluctance to immediately resume their previous spending patterns.  The reduced sales 
trends in spinach indicate the American public has not fully regained their trust in the 
safety of spinach.  One can expect an even more significant backlash to this multi-crop 
counterfactual case.  Further, if the contamination were attributed to intentional 
contamination, this reaction would be heightened even further.  Additionally, the more 
time between the initial outbreaks and identification of the contamination source, the 
greater the level of fear and panic rising in the public.  Finally, if the attacks were 
recurring, this increasing level of fear and panic would be greater still.  Even during the 
periods between attacks would be times of uncertainty and distrust, as the public 
anticipated subsequent attacks.  As illnesses continued to be reported across the nation, 
                                                 
158 Shulamith Kreitler, PhD, “Coping With Panic and Fear of a Nonconventional Threat,” Clinics in 
Dermatology 2 (2002): 413–419. 
159 Margot J. Fromer, “Dr. Fauci on Bioterrorism: Threat But Not Cause for Panic,” Oncology Times 
25:10 (2003): 45. 
160 Ibid. 
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state and federal agencies would likely be seen as ineffective and powerless to assure the 
safety of the nation’s food.  Not only would this fear manifest in consumer backlash as 
discussed above, but also in over-prophylaxis as seen in the Anthrax case and panic 
stockpiling of canned and other processed foods.   
E.  CONCLUSION 
The 2006 national outbreak of E. coli contamination in spinach was an incident of 
national significance.  Although only three people died and 200 were sickened (a small 
number compared to the average number of food-borne illness reported every year), it 
was significant because it was concentrated, both in time and source.  The national 
spinach market ground to a halt, and long term affects are still being felt by spinach 
growers in California.  However, on a national level, this case is less significant.  Because 
spinach was identified as the source of contamination, other products (with the exception 
of bagged salads that include spinach) were largely not affected.  The $77 million loss in 
spinach sales is significant to the Salinas Valley region, but pales when compared to the 
$1 trillion role agriculture plays in the U.S. economy.   
In the 2006 E. coli outbreak, the national health and epidemiology systems were 
effective in identifying clusters of ill people and tracing the source of the contamination 
to the spinach fields in Salinas and dispatch response and investigative teams.  While 
source identification enabled government and industry to work together to remove 
potentially contaminated products from the stores, it is was likely there was already 
reduced amounts of contaminated products available due to expiration and “best if used 
by” dates that were expiring.  Overall, the system worked as it was designed; however, it 
did not significantly impact the number of people who contaminated food.  By the time 
the cause was identified and response mechanisms in place, the outbreak was largely 
over.  Therefore, while the system appears to be largely ineffective in preventing or 
significantly reducing a nation-wide E. coli outbreak, the very nature of a bacterial 
outbreak such as E. coli renders this largely unimportant, because by the time people start 




The counterfactual cases presented in the previous chapters allow for a tentative 
evaluation of the debate within escalation theory presented in Chapter 1.  Given 
escalation theories assumption that globally established terrorist groups must maintain or 
increase their level of violence or impact with each subsequent attack, what do these case 
studies tell us about the probability of terrorist organizations turning to agroterror as their 
next course of action?  This thesis asks a series of questions:  Would an attack against the 
nation’s agriculture base be likely to create enough casualties, economic disruption, 
and/or fear and uncertainty to be attractive to terrorists?  Is it likely that the impact of an 
attack would be largely contained by the systems in place, or do the vulnerabilities 
created by centralized distribution and limited response create an attractive target for the 
terrorists?  Additionally, while these response measures have been effective in recent and 
admittedly limited natural outbreaks, would multiple attacks overwhelm the system?   
A. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
1. Would an attack against the nation’s agriculture base be likely to 
create enough casualties to meet the threshold of escalation? 
In both the FMD and E. coli case studies and associated counterfactual cases, the 
number of human casualties is relatively minimal.  In the FMD case, one can expect no 
deaths attributable to FMD, as the disease targets livestock and is readily detected before 
contaminating the food supply.  The same holds true with illness; one can expect 
detection of infected cows prior to their introduction into the food chain, and even if 
detection failed, infected meat will not make people ill.  In the counterfactual multi-crop 
E. coli attack proposed in Chapter 3, total casualties are estimated to be approximately 50 
dead.  Although repeated attacks might lead to slightly higher numbers, total deaths 
would still be expected to be insignificant in comparison to other global terrorist attacks.  
Therefore, agroterror attacks against the U.S. are not likely to produce casualties in 
sufficient numbers to constitute escalation. 
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2. Would an attack against the nation’s agriculture base be likely to 
create enough economic disruption to meet the threshold of 
escalation? 
Of the two counterfactual scenarios, a FMD attack would clearly have more 
significant financial impact on the nation.  While an E. coli attack would have regional 
impact, the potential $1 billion economic loss represents a negligible percentage of U.S. 
GDP -- less than 0.01%.  Certainly, those directly reliant upon the vegetable sector for 
their livelihood could face significant economic hardship; however, in the larger 
perspective, such an attack would be an isolated blip in the U.S. economy as a whole.  
FMD, the other hand, would have a much larger national impact.  Direct costs of a 
national FMD outbreak are estimated at between $50 and $100 billion, or close to 1% of 
annual GDP, with indirect costs likely even higher over the course of the epidemic and 
recovery phases.  While FMD outbreaks pose a significantly greater economic challenge 
than an E. coli attack, livestock still represents only a small sector impact on the U.S. 
economy.  To compare, in a summary of eight separate analyses, the GAO estimated the 
economic impact of the September 11th attacks at between $83 and $191 billion, in both 
direct and indirect costs.161  While the total economic damage inflicted by a major FMD 
attack could be just as costly, it important to note that the estimated economic impact of 
such an attack would be spread out over a 5 to 10 year period.  The fact that the economic 
impact of a FMD outbreak would be spread out over such a long period reduces the 
impact of the overall cost.  Thus, although the total monetary impact of an FMD attack 
might match the economic impact of the September 11th attacks, such an attack still 
would not meet the threshold of escalation because of the dissipated impact over time. 
3. Would an attack against the nation’s agriculture base be likely to 
create enough fear and uncertainty to meet the threshold of 
escalation? 
Attacking a nation’s food source has the potential to create panic in its public.  
While a nation can survive by altering flying patterns or accepting other inconveniences 
in travel security, people cannot survive without a safe food supply.  However, neither of 
                                                 
161 GAO, “GAO-02-700R; Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, 
Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center, (Washington D.C.: GAO, May 2002), 2-3. 
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these counterfactual cases shows the potential to impact Americans’ way of life for any 
significant period of time. 
A FMD attack would initially create significant fear and uncertainty as a 
deliberate attack would likely lead to a nation-wide epidemic, affecting large portions of 
the cattle, sheep, and swine sectors.  However, because FMD infections would not spread 
to humans, the uncertainty would center on specific sectors of the food supply.  There 
would be significant reductions in availability of meat from the affected sectors, but that 
only means people would have to adjust their consumption habits.  Psychological impacts 
of the recovery efforts (funeral pyres, piles of carcasses, etc), could be more significant, 
but even those affects would be relatively short-lived and supportable by crisis response 
capabilities, and have little residual impact after the recovery phase. 
As the Salinas case study showed, an E. coli outbreak is largely self-limiting, and 
would run its course over time.  Even though repeated attacks on the produce sector 
would have a more discernable impact, consumers would likely adjust their buying habits 
to avoid the at-risk product until assured of their safety.  Americans could rely upon 
cooked vegetables or canned or processed foods, and while their confidence in the safety 
of lettuce and spinach might be low following an attack on that sector, the fear and 
uncertainty would likely only be felt by that particular sector, and be measured purely by 
economic impact to that sector.  Fear and uncertainty would not likely cross over into the 
general public and therefore not meet the concept of escalation.   
4. Does the combination of casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear 
and uncertainty meet the threshold of escalation? 
The combination of these three factors makes an agroterror attack more 
significant than when evaluating one factor individually.  However, as discussed above, 
although the public response to large scale terrorist attack is harder to measure or 
estimate than pure economic impacts, it is unlikely that agroterror would have the overall 
impact that more conventional attacks have had, both in the U.S. and internationally.   
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5. Is it likely that an agroterror attack would be largely contained by the 
systems in place?  Would multiple attacks likely overwhelm those 
systems?    
The FMD case study shows the U.S. livestock industry is vulnerable to a FMD 
attack.  Livestock is highly concentrated, accessible, and vulnerable to introduction of 
this highly contagious disease, and the resulting epidemic would be rapid and 
widespread.  While this vulnerability might lead one to believe livestock poses an 
attractive target for potential attack, the impact of the attack must be evaluated.  National 
containment measures would be implemented immediately, and while they might not stop 
the spread of the disease (as in the U.K. case) they would ensure the diseased animals did 
not enter the food supply.  Ongoing recovery efforts would be both expensive and 
lengthy, but would likely be successful in eradicating the disease and reestablishing the 
safety and health of U.S. livestock.  The established systems within the U.S. would 
largely be effective in identifying and responding to a FMD attack; while the system may 
respond too slowly to prevent an epidemic, it would likely be effective reducing its 
impact on humans. 
E. coli is more harmful to humans, but less contagious.  In fact, the bacteria must 
be directly consumed in order to cause illness or death.  As the Salinas case study shows, 
even a multi-crop intentional contamination would run its course and even without 
concerted governmental effort, over time the contaminated produce would naturally 
disappear from the market.  Therefore, the systems are adequate for response to a 
agroterror attack using bacterial agents such as E. coli.  A contamination of this type 
would be largely self-limiting, and any government or industry response would accelerate 
this recovery, even if only moderately.   
A successful FMD attack would be likely be so successful in spreading the 
disease and initiating an epidemic that successive attacks would not be necessary or have 
a dramatically different outcome.  Any successive attack would extend the recovery 
period, but would not extend or increase the impact of the initial attack.  Successive E. 
coli attacks however, would have a moderately different outcome than a single attack.  
The impact would certainly be larger, although each successive attack would likely have 
a reduced overall affect.  While contaminating different sources might initially 
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complicate source identification, the dispersion of health care providers that would be 
instrumental in identifying the illnesses would enable the system to cope with an 
increased number of illnesses.  Therefore, repeated attacks are not likely to overwhelm 
the systems in place. 
B. CONCLUSION 
While agroterror has the potential to cause illness, death, economic damage, and 
fear and uncertainty, it has inherent limitations as a tool of terror.  It is not splashy and 
does not have the emotional impact of a conventional attack.  This thesis has evaluated 
two different types of potential agroterror in order to determine if attacks on the U.S. 
could be significant enough in terms of escalation theory for an established terrorist 
organization to execute.  The analysis shows that neither a FMD attack on livestock nor 
an E. coli attack on produce is likely to cause sufficient casualties, economic disruption, 
and/or fear and panic to constitute escalation from recent conventional attacks for an 
established international terrorist organization, and therefore agroterror attacks are not 
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APPENDIX A. U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
 
Figure 20.   Global Wheat Exports.162 
 
Figure 21.   Global Corn Exports163 
                                                 
162From USDA, “Agricultural Baseline Projections: Global Agricultural Trade, 2007-2016,” 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Baseline/trade.htm (accessed 21 August 07). 




Figure 22.   Global Soybean Exports164 
 
 
Figure 23.   Global Cotton Exports 165 
                                                 
164 From USDA, “Agricultural Baseline Projections.” 
165 From Ibid. 
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APPENDIX B. U.S. MEAT EXPORTS 
 
Figure 24.   U.S. Meat Exports 166 
                                                 
166 From USDA, “Agricultural Baseline Projections.”. 
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APPENDIX C. OIE LIST A AND LIST B DISEASES167 
OIE LIST A AND LIST B DISEASES 
Article 1.1.2.1.  The following diseases  
are included in List A: 
Article 1.1.2.2.  The following diseases are 
included in List B, (multiple species diseases): 
Foot and mouth disease Anthrax 
Vesicular stomatitis Aujeszky's disease 
Swine vesicular disease Echinococcosis/hydatidosis 
Rinderpest Heartwater 
Peste des petits ruminants Leptospirosis 
Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia Q fever 
Lumpy skin disease Rabies 
Rift Valley fever Paratuberculosis 
Bluetongue New world screwworm  
Sheep pox and goat pox Old world screwworm  
African horse sickness Trichinellosis. 
African swine fever  
Classical swine fever  
Highly pathogenic avian influenza  
Newcastle disease.  
Article 1.1.2.3.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (cattle diseases): 
Article 1.1.2.4.  The following diseases are 
included in List B, (sheep and goat diseases): 
Bovine anaplasmosis Ovine epididymitis (Brucella ovis) 
Bovine babesiosis Caprine and ovine brucellosis (excluding B. ovis) 
Bovine brucellosis Caprine arthritis/encephalitis 
Bovine genital campylobacteriosis Contagious agalactia 
Bovine tuberculosis Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia 
Bovine cysticercosis Enzootic abortion of ewes (ovine chlamydiosis) 
Dermatophilosis Ovine pulmonary adenomatosis 
Enzootic bovine leukosis Nairobi sheep disease 
Haemorrhagic septicaemia Salmonellosis (S. abortusovis) 
Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis/ infectious 
pustular vulvovaginitis Scrapie 
Theileriosis Maedi-visna. 
Trichomonosis  
Trypanosomosis (tsetse-transmitted)  
Malignant catarrhal fever  
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy  
                                                 
167 From The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), “OIE List A and List B Diseases,” 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/ancien%20fichier/a_00004.htm (accessed October 22, 2007). 
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Article 1.1.2.5.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (equine diseases): 
Article 1.1.2.6.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (swine diseases):  
Contagious equine metritis Atrophic rhinitis of swine 
Dourine Porcine cysticercosis 
Epizootic lymphangitis Porcine brucellosis 
Equine encephalomyelitis (East and West) Transmissible gastroenteritis 
Equine infectious anaemia Enterovirus encephalomyelitis 
Equine influenza Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome. 
Equine piroplasmosis  
Equine rhinopneumonitis  
Glanders  
Horse pox  
Equine viral arteritis  
Japanese encephalitis  
Horse mange  
Surra (Trypanosoma evansi)  
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.  
Article 1.1.2.7.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (avian diseases): 
Article 1.1.2.8.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (lagomorph diseases): 
Avian infectious bronchitis Myxomatosis 
Avian infectious laryngotracheitis Tularemia 
Avian tuberculosis Rabbit haemorrhagic disease. 
Duck virus hepatitis  
Duck virus enteritis  
Fowl cholera  
Fowl pox  
Fowl typhoid  
Infectious bursal disease (Gumboro disease)  
Marek's disease  
Avian mycoplasmosis (M. gallisepticum)  
Avian chlamydiosis  
Pullorum disease.  
 
Article 1.1.2.9.  The following diseases  
are included in List B, (bee diseases): 
Article 1.1.2.10.  The following disease is 
included in List B, (other diseases): 
Acariosis of bees Leishmaniosis 
American foulbrood  
European foulbrood  
Nosemosis of bees  
Varroosis.   
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